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A cognitive pragmatic approach is taken to some long-standing problem cases of
negation, the so-called presupposition denial cases. It is argued that a full account
of the processes and levels of representation involved in their interpretation typically
requires the sequential pragmatic derivation of two diﬀerent propositions expressed.
The ®rst is one in which the presupposition is preserved and, following the rejection
of this, the second involves the echoic (metalinguistic) use of material falling in the
scope of the negation. The semantic base for these processes is the standard anti-
presuppositionalist wide-scope negation. A diﬀerent view, developed by Burton-
Roberts (1989a, b), takes presupposition to be a semantic relation encoded in natural
language and so argues for a negation operator that does not cancel presuppositions.
This view is shown to be ¯awed, in that it makes the false prediction that
presupposition denial cases are semantic contradictions and it is based on too narrow
a view of the role of pragmatic inferencing.
1.I ntroduction
I am going to look at some recent accounts of the interpretation of certain
negative sentences, those exempli®ed in (1)±(3), concentrating on the only
too familiar one in (1):
(1) The king of France isn't bald ± there is no king of France.
(2) I don't regret inviting him ± he jolly well gate-crashed.
(3) I haven't stopped smoking ± I've never smoked in my life.
These are cases of what is known as `presupposition'-cancelling negation (P-
cancellation, from now on), which is usually felt to be rather marked or
unnatural. This interpretation of negation would not generally be the one to
come to mind if the ®rst negative sentence in each case were presented in
isolation. For instance, (1) without the second clause would usually be taken
[1] The impetus for this paper came from the work of Noel Burton-Roberts, as will be amply
obvious throughout. Although I take a very diﬀerent line from him, the development of my
position has been greatly furthered by the interesting discussions I have had with him and
his generous encouragement. I am grateful to the two JL referees of the paper who made
many useful suggestions, both substantive and stylistic. Many thanks also to Mira Ariel,
Ad Foolen, Thorstein Fretheim, Larry Horn, Eun-Ju Noh, Neil Smith, Deirdre Wilson and
Vladimir Zegarac who have each, in their diﬀerent ways, helped me to plug on.
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to be predicating non-baldness of an existing king of France, and (2) without
the second clause would be interpreted as my having invited him and not
regretting having done so. However, the more marked interpretation is easily
derived once the second clause, in which the presupposed proposition is
explicitly denied, has been processed, and the interpretation seems to be
perfectly acceptable. It is this interpretation that I want to focus on here since
it has recently been the subject of an interesting and, so far, unresolved
debate, which raises questions about (a) the nature of negation, (b) the
proper treatment of those implications standardly called `presuppositions'
and (c) the wider issue of the respective roles of semantics and pragmatics in
utterance interpretation.
Both Horn (1985, 1989) and Burton-Roberts (1989a, b) (henceforth B-R)
treat (1)±(3) as involving what they call metalinguistic negation, which they
take to be a pragmatic phenomenon, quite distinct from standard truth-
functional descriptive negation. It has the approximate meaning `I object to
U' or `U is inappropriate}unassertable', where U is an utterance of the
positive counterpart of the negative sentence. For the examples under
discussion, the idea is that the positive form, say `The king of France is bald',
is being rejected as inappropriate because one of its presuppositions, here the
existential one, is not ful®lled, as the follow-up clause makes explicit. The
metalinguistic understanding of the negative sentence is derived by a hearer
when the descriptive, truth-based, understanding, which is accessed ®rst, is
rejected for some reason.
B-R's primary commitment is to establishing the presuppositional nature
of natural language and his interest in a metalinguistic analysis of (1)±(3)i s
geared to this end. On his view, presupposition is a semantic relation encoded
into the language system. Horn, on the other hand, stands with the anti-
presuppositionalists, in that he believes that there is no such semantic
relation additional to the semantic relation of entailment and that
`presuppositional' eﬀects are to be understood pragmatically. B-R (1989a, b)
claims that Horn's commitments lead him into a double bind, whereby he is
explicitly supporting the view which disavows the existence of semantic
presupposition and simultaneously, due to his treatment of these examples as
metalinguistic negations, implicitly supporting the semantic pre-
suppositionalists. Horn (1990) continues to protest his freedom from this
error, maintaining his overt support for a presupposition-free semantics. In
my attempt to ®nd an adequate account of the interpretation of these
examples and of the processes involved in arriving at that interpretation, I
shall explore the alleged Hornian dilemma. I believe that one consequence of
my account is a vindication of Horn's general stance with regard to these
examples and the evaporation of any appearance of dilemma.
Before getting under way, I should point out that I am concerned here just
with what Horn (1989: chapter 7) calls the `predicate denial' manifestation
of negation; that is, the denial of the applicability of the predicate to the
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subject. This is one way of construing a negation whose scope is maximally
wide; its domain is essentially the same as that of the Fregeans' sentence (or
propositional) negation operator, but, arguably, it is a more natural way of
viewing the manifestations of wide scope negation in natural languages. It is
typically aﬃxed to an auxiliary verb and pronounced [bnt], as in the examples
in (1)±(3), though it may also occur as the free morpheme pronounced [not].
That is, we won't be considering here `term (constituent) negation', which
necessarily maintains existential}factive commitments, although it does
make a brief appearance in section 5.2. For example, on its predicate term
negation interpretation, `The king of France is not happy' predicates the
negative term `not happy' of the king of France. Predicate denial (or
sentence negation), on the other hand, may or may not be interpreted as
maintaining existential entailments; for an anti-presuppositionalist such as
Horn the possible grounds for a predicate denial include the nonexistence of
anything which the subject denotes. For a semantic presuppositionalist, such
as B-R, this would not be a possible ground, as the negation of a sentence (or
its predicate denial) does not touch its presuppositions.
The next two sections are essentially scene-setting. Section 2 surveys the
two rival positions on these sentences, which are my point of departure.
Section 3 takes a look at the phenomenon of metalinguistic negation, which
®gures prominently in one of the two analyses outlined in section 2 and in a
third analysis, which I shall propose in section 6. Section 4 spells out some
of the diﬀerences between B-R and Horn, in particular B-R's allegation of
inconsistent commitments on Horn's part. Section 5 has a demolitionary
purpose: it presents (strong, I think) evidence against two assumptions
that underpin B-R's position: (a) that presupposition-denials (such as
(1)±(3)) are semantic contradictions, and (b) that presupposition-denials are
inevitably interpreted metalinguistically. The paper ends with some general
but quite fundamental ruminations on the nature of pragmatics and the
semantics}pragmatics distinction.
2.T he two basic positions
The names most readily associated with discussions of the semantics of these
negative presuppositional sentences are Russell and Strawson. As is very well
known, Russell accommodated the negation in example (1), by taking the
negative sentence to have two possible logical forms; that is, to be
ambiguous. In one of these logical forms, his quanti®cational semantics for
de®nite descriptions takes wide scope over the negation operator, thereby
leaving the existential implication unnegated (P-preservation), and in the
other, the description falls within the scope of negation (P-cancellation). It is
the latter that occurs in example (1). He thereby avoided any postulation of
a semantic relation of presupposition and maintained the bivalency of the
logic of such sentences. Strawson, on the other hand, advocated a univocal
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P-preserving negation operator; this followed from his fundamental
distinction between presupposition and assertion, presuppositions precisely
being those implications which must be ful®lled if a sentence and its
corresponding negation are to succeed in making any assertion}statement at
all. A problem with his approach, which is often pointed out, is that he gave
no account of examples such as (1)±(3). Later semantic presuppositionalists
addressed this matter by postulating two logical operators with negative
force, the one P-preserving and the other P-cancelling, thus requiring that the
logic of natural language be trivalent or, at least, that it admit truth-value
gaps. There is a mild irony to be enjoyed here: semantic presuppositionalists,
ostensibly followers of Strawson, the advocate of a univocal negation
operator, have generally found it necessary to postulate an ambiguity in the
negation operator, while the anti-presuppositionalist followers of Russell,
who required a scope ambiguity in the negation operator, have generally
advocated a semantically and syntactically unambiguous negation operator,
as we will shortly see.
However, the most interesting and least extravagant of modern day
semantic presuppositionalists, Burton-Roberts, follows Strawson's lead with
regard to the univocality of the semantics of natural language negation. He
argues convincingly, against the received view, that it is contradictory to
maintain both that natural languages are semantically presuppositional and
that they have a negation operator that cancels presuppositions, as in the
examples (1)±(3). This, he says, is tantamount to inventing a second operator
to mop up a set of counterexamples to the thesis that natural languages are
presuppositional, a thesis which entails that their negative sentences cannot
be P-cancelling. No logical theory of presupposition can include a semantic
means of presupposition cancellation. B-R is surely right about this; his
argument clears up a conceptual confusion perpetrated by pre-
suppositionalists and anti-presuppositionalists alike. Semantic presuppo-
sition does not entail the semantic ambiguity of negation, quite the contrary.
He himself advocates a single negation operator which, strictly speaking,
is neither P-cancelling nor P-preserving; it is semantically wide in scope but
`Not-A is not expressive of the falsity of the presuppositions of A' (B-R 1993:
33). P-preservation is essentially a semantic matter, although it is not truth-
conditional. B-R (1989b:148±150) describes the existential presupposition of
`The F is not G' as a default semantic implication and B-R (1993: 36±38)
explains it as the result of an interaction of the negative sentence (which
cannot cancel presuppositions) and a fundamental cognitive principle of
bivalence: the proposition is tacitly aﬃrmed by virtue of being in the domain
of denial (negation) but not itself denied. This is weaker and subtler than
Strawson's presupposition-preserving negation operator, which, B-R (1993)
shows, does not yield an internally coherent semantic account of presup-
position and negation. B-R's view that the preservation of presupposition
in negative sentences does not require a negation operator which itself
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encodes P-preservation is an interesting development, though not without
problems of its own (even assuming that the idea of a sentential negation that
neither cancels nor preserves certain entailments of that sentence is a
coherent notion, something which is far from immediately apparent).#
However, for my purposes here, the details can be left aside; the common
core of Strawson's and B-R's presuppositional views is that the negation
operator does not (cannot) cancel presuppositions. It is this broad distinction
between semantic presuppositional views and anti-presuppositional views
which is relevant here.
To complete his account, B-R has to confront the fact that in the examples
in (1)±(3) the negation in the ®rst sentence, which is followed by a clause
explicitly denying a presupposition, must be interpreted as cancelling that
presupposition, if the examples as a whole are to be understood as consistent.
This he does, by insisting that these have a special `metalinguistic'
interpretation, which is entirely a matter of pragmatics, lying beyond the
expressive power of the linguistic system itself, as he puts it. The semantics
of the sentence pairs in each example delivers a contradiction; for instance,
in (1) that there is a king of France and that there isn't a king of France. It
is this contradictory, and so unacceptable, interpretation, supplied by the
language itself, which triggers the search for some other way of construing
these utterances and results in the metalinguistic interpretation. I will look
more closely at the phenomenon of metalinguistic interpretation in the next
section. An interim and terse summing up of B-R's view at this point is the
following: the P-preserving interpretation of negative sentences is given by
linguistic semantics and bivalence, and the P-cancelling interpretation,
required for (1)±(3), is derived by a process of pragmatic inference.
Let us move now to the opposition. I will refer to this as the
`anti±presuppositionalist' position, where this is to be understood as
shorthand for the position that there is no semantic relation of pre-
supposition encoded in natural language; the phenomena that B-R treats as
semantic presuppositions are simply ordinary entailments though they often
have a special pragmatic status. This is essentially the position of Grice
(1981) and of a number of linguists and philosophers, whom I shall refer to,
somewhat loosely, as `Griceans', where this is to be understood as those who
advocate a pragmatic derivation of presuppositional eﬀects. I include here
[2] B-R's presuppositional logic for natural language is bivalent with truth-value gaps; that is,
presupposition failure leads not to a third truth-value, but to sentences which are simply
not truth-evaluable (see B-R (1989b), especially chapter 6). However, according to his 1993
account of the intuition of presupposition-preservation under negation, a cognitive
Principle of Bivalence inevitably induces the aﬃrmation of the presupposition, since,
semantically, it is not denied though it is in the domain of denial. The upshot of this is that
in a case of a negative sentence with presupposition failure (e.g. `The king of France is not
wise'), that which is aﬃrmed (`there is a king of France') is false, so the whole
sentence}utterance is false, contrary to the truth-value gap predicted by B-R's
presuppositional logic. (See Burton-Roberts (1993: 35±38) or the reprinting (1997: 82±85).)
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Kempson (1975), Wilson (1975), Boer & Lycan (1976), Atlas (1977, 1989),
Gazdar (1979) and Horn (1985), though there are important diﬀerences of
detail among them. Given the focus of this paper, I will con®ne myself to
what they have to say about negative presuppositional sentences for the
moment.
Interestingly, Grice himself seems to have been comfortable with a
position that maintains both the Russellian scope ambiguity of negation and
gives a pragmatic (implicature) account of the P-preserving understanding,
which is the preferred one even when negation takes wide scope. For
instance, the implication that `there is an F' in the familiar `The F is not G'
type of example is derived as a generalised conversational implicature. While
the `Gricean' views (of Atlas, Kempson, Wilson, etc.) also derive the P-
preserving interpretation pragmatically, their claim is that negation itself is
semantically univocal and maximally wide in scope.$ This view of negation,
clearly, accommodates our key examples since it cancels all semantic
implications of the corresponding positive sentence, including its alleged
presuppositions. The preferred P-preserving understanding of negative
sentences is arrived at pragmatically. Horn (1989: chapter 7) refers in a
general sort of a way to `some process of pragmatic strengthening' which
would yield this interpretation. This might take the form of an implicated
assumption, as Grice (1981) suggests; in that paper, he gives an explicit
account of the derivation of the implicature on the basis of a manner maxim
of `conversational tailoring', which I won't reiterate here. Alternatively, it
may be treated as one instance of the prevalent process of relevance-driven
pragmatic enrichment at the level of the proposition expressed by the
utterance (see Sperber & Wilson 1986, Carston 1988, Wilson & Sperber
1993); how this narrowing process proceeds in the negation case is discussed
in section 6.2 below. Given the broad brush diﬀerences I am concerned with
here (between the semantic presuppositionalist and the pragmatic pre-
suppositionalists), I leave aside an assessment of these two diﬀerent ways of
cashing out the pragmatic story of P-preservation.
The two rival analyses then agree in just one respect: semantically (that is,
in terms of the meaning encoded in the language system), there is a single
negation operator or a single meaning for `not'. However, they diﬀer in every
otherrespect:thissinglenegationoperatorisquitediﬀerentinitsfunctioning,
on the two views, and the respective roles of semantics and pragmatics in
accounting for the P-preserving and P-cancelling cases are eﬀectively the
opposite of each other. This is perhaps made more vivid by the following
[3] Atlas (1977, 1989) advocates an even more radically neutral semantics for the univocal
negation operator; this is his `sense-generality' of negation thesis. According to this,
negation is semantically unspeci®ed as to scope (whether wide or narrow) and as to its
interaction with presuppositions. As a result every utterance involving negation requires
some pragmatic inference to determine its intended function, including cases of wide scope
P-cancelling negation.
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contrasting schematic representations of the way the two approaches treat
negative sentences of the form `The F is not G':
A. Burton-Roberts (semantic presuppositionalist):
Semantically: The F is not-G (P-preserving)
Pragmatically: not [The F is G] (P-cancelling)
B. `Griceans' (anti-presuppositionalists):
Semantically: not [the F is G] (P-cancelling)%
Pragmatically: The F is not-G (P-preserving)
This apparent symmetry should not mislead us, though, into assuming that
the P-cancelling representations here (pragmatically derived in the one case,
semantic in the other) are in fact identical. While this is descriptive truth-
functional negation on the Gricean view, it is a special (pragmatically
derived) metalinguistic negation on B-R's view. I will brie¯y outline the
phenomenon of metalinguistic negation now, highlighting those aspects of it
that have a bearing on the subsequent discussion.&
3.M etalinguistic negation
Both B-R and Horn assimilate examples (1)±(3) into the class of
metalinguistic negation (MN) and I too call on it in my proposed account of
these examples. We three construe this use of negation rather diﬀerently from
each other.
3.1 The standard view
Here's a set of cases that everyone agrees are instances of metalinguistic
negation:
[4] The semi-formal representation here with the `not' placed outside the positive sentence
re¯ects the one-place propositional connective of the Fregean logical system. Horn prefers
the Aristotelian predicate denial formulation and has rather good arguments for it, so an
alternative representation of this level might be [The F is-not G] as a way of capturing the
idea that `not' is a mode of predication. Nothing hangs here on the diﬀerence in the
formulations since both encompass so-called presupposition-cancellation.
[5] Recently, there has been considerable discussion about whether natural language
determiners other than `the' are `presuppositional'. The issue concerns whether the
semantics of `every' is equivalent to the classical logical universal quanti®er or is stronger
in that it incorporates an existential implication. Cases such as the following seem to
suggest that it does, since the non-existence of any American king prompts the intuition
that these are truth-valueless (unde®ned):
(i) Every American king lived in New York.
(ii) Every American king didn't live in New York.
Many of the issues addressed in this paper carry over to these examples, in particular, the
interaction of negation with the apparently presuppositional subject noun phrase and the
fact that the most natural interpretation of (ii) is metalinguistic. See Lappin & Reinhart
(1988) and Lasersohn (1993) for non-semantic accounts of how the existential constraint
on `every' (and other strong determiners) arises in use.
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(4) (a) The points aren't at diﬀerent locuses; they're at diﬀerent loci.
(b) We're not halfway there; we've got halfway to go.
(c) Poor old Mr Dean's not a bachelor; he's an unmarried man.
(d) I won't deprive you of my lecture on negation; I'll spare you it.
(e) She hasn't read some of Chomsky's books; she's read everything he
ever wrote.
(f) Bob isn't either neurotic or paranoid; he's both!
These have all the properties of the most often cited types of cases: (i) they
consist of a negative sentence followed by a `recti®cation' clause; (ii) taken
descriptively they are (truth-conditional) contradictions; (iii) readers may be
garden-pathed, in that their ®rst interpretation of the negative sentence is
descriptive and when they process the second clause they ®nd they must `go
back' and reanalyse the negative sentence as metalinguistic; (iv) if read
aloud, these examples would tend to receive the so-called contradiction
intonation contour (involving a ®nal rise within the negative clause), with
contrastive stress on the oﬀending item and its correction in the second
clause.
These examples with these properties are perfectly representative of the
sort of example given by B-R (1989a, b) and reasonably representative of the
type of example given by Horn (1985, 1989: chapter 6). The negation
operator itself is said by Horn to be interpreted as `I object to U', where U
is a prior (or, perhaps, potential) utterance of the corresponding positive
sentence (e.g. `She's read some of Chomsky's books' in the case of (4e)). The
aspect of the utterance that is objected to is something other than its truth-
conditional content: morphology in (4a), an attitudinal or perspectival
elementin (4b),stereotypicalconnotationsin (4c),a conventionalimplicature
in (4d) and generalised conversational implicatures in (4e) and (4f). So the
meaning that the negation operator has in these examples is held to be quite
distinct from the descriptive truth-functional meaning which negation
semantically encodes; this derived meaning is pragmatically inferred.
3.2 A diﬀerent view
I have argued, in Carston (1994) and Carston & Noh (1995), that in fact none
of the standardly cited properties is necessary. I won't repeat those
arguments here, except for presenting one type of example which will prove
relevant to later discussion. Consider the following:
(5) (a) Maggie's not patriotic or quixotic; she's patriotic and quixotic.
(b) Maggie's patriotic and quixotic; she's not patriotic or quixotic.
(6) (a) I won't deprive you of my lecture on negation; I'll spare you it.
(b) I'll spare you my lecture on negation; I won't deprive you of it.
The diﬀerence between the (a) and (b) cases is simple and obvious: the two
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clauses are presented in opposite order. The (a) versions are instances of the
general pattern of cases given above in (4), with the various properties just
outlined, including contradictoriness and garden-pathing potential. What, if
any, eﬀect does reversing the order have, as in the (b) cases? It clearly doesn't
alter their contradictoriness (`P; not P' is no less contradictory than `not P;
P') or the metalinguistic nature of the negative utterances:
(7) A: Don't deprive us of your lecture on negation.
B: I'll spare you my lecture on negation; I won't deprive you of it.
However, in the (b) cases, since the correction clause is processed ®rst it is
part of the context in which the negative clause is processed so it is very
unlikely that there is any garden-pathing, requiring double processing of the
negative sentence. The metalinguistic nature of this utterance of the negative
sentence will be recognised on the ®rst pass through the utterance, without
any preliminary stage at which it is analysed descriptively. The ®rst clause
makes it clear to the hearer that the speaker does not dispute the truth-
conditional content of the positive counterpart of the negative sentence (that
Maggie is patriotic or quixotic, in (5b), and that the speaker won't be giving
her lecture on negation in (6b)), since the ®rst clause either expresses the same
proposition as the positive utterance would (in (6b)) or a stronger one that
entails it (in (5b)). The point, then, is that the negative clause will be
processed straight oﬀ as a case of metalinguistic use, something that neither
Horn nor B-R allow for. While this simple observation is relevant here, in
that it undercuts much of what has been taken to be typical of metalinguistic
negation, its real interest will emerge later (in section 6) when we look at
reversed presupposition-denial cases.
I will mention brie¯y now the positive aspects of my account of
metalinguistic negation. They are: (i) the only essential property of these
cases is that (some, at least) of the material falling within the scope of the
negation operator is to be understood as `echoically used' in the sense of
Sperber & Wilson (1986), Wilson & Sperber (1988, 1992), and (ii) the
negation operator itself acquires no special pragmatic meaning such as `I
object to U' (Horn 1985: 136); in all these cases it is interpreted as standard
truth-functional negation. Let's take each of these in turn.
A representation is used echoically when it attributes some aspect of its
form or content to someone other than the speaker herself at that moment
and expresses an attitude to that aspect. The attribution may be explicit or
implicit, and the expression of attitude may be explicit or implicit. Hence all
of the following can involve echoic use:
(8) (a) A good time to buy, he said.
(b) A good time to buy, I don't think.
(c) A good time to buy, indeed.
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(d) She eats tom[eiDouz].
(e) I don't eat tom[eiDouz]; (I eat tom[a:touz].)
In (8a) the attributive nature of the utterance is made explicit; the speaker
may be merely reporting someone's utterance or she may be echoing the
proposition that it is}was a good time to buy in order to express (implicitly)
her own attitude to it, an attitude of either an endorsing or a dissociating
nature. In (8b) a dissociating attitude is made explicit. In (8c) both the
attribution of the propositional content and the attitude to it are implicit;
when that attitude is dissociative (which would have to be pragmatically
inferred) the utterance is a case of irony (see Wilson & Sperber 1992). In the
last two examples, what is attributed is a formal aspect of the utterance, here
phonetic form; in (8d) the attribution (presumably to the person referred to
by `she') and the speaker's attitude are implicit. In (8e), a standard case of
metalinguistic negation, the attribution is implicit while the attitude of
dissociation is made perfectly explicit by the use of the negation. This, I have
argued, is the only essential property of metalinguistic negation.
Both Horn and B-R acknowledge the quotational or metarepresentational
nature of material in the scope of the negation operator. Horn (1989, 392)
talks of the negation operator and the material in its scope as `operating on
diﬀerent levels'; B-R (1989b: 235) homes in more closely on this feature
when he writes of negation operating `on the mention of a proposition
previously used ± i.e. operating on the speaker's quotation of a previous
speaker's use of [a sentence]'. However, neither makes much of this; they
tend rather to emphasise such features as those given in the previous section,
while, in my view, it is the implicit (that is, not linguistically signalled)
metarepresentational nature of material in the scope of the negation which
is the single essential and unifying property of cases of metalinguistic
negation. B-R takes the fundamental unifying property of all cases of
metalinguistic negation to be their literal contradictoriness. As we will see
later, this is crucial to his metalinguistic account of the presupposition-
denials and, more fundamentally still, to his semantic stance with regard to
presupposition. This is taken up in section 5.
The probably more contentious part of my view is that the negation
operator here is not interpreted any diﬀerently from the negation in a
descriptive (non-metalinguistic) case. That he ®nds this inimical has been
made very clear by Horn, who insists that, in the metalinguistic cases,
negation is understood as a non-truth-functional operator, expressing
objection to an utterance, and `irreducible to the ordinary internal truth-
functional operator' (Horn (1985: 132; 1989: 434). As far as I can see, B-R
goes along with this, although he is not fully explicit on the point; the only
truth-functional negation operator he can countenance in his pre-
suppositional semantics is one that does not cancel presuppositions, so in the
presupposition-denial cases, negation must be receiving some other in-
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terpretation. Horn's conviction comes from the fact that a truth-functional
negation, by de®nition, takes as its argument a (truth-evaluable) proposition,
while the target of negation in the metalinguistic cases can be any one of a
ragbag of formal and other non-truth-conditional properties of an utterance.
On the surface this does seem persuasive, but there are some considerations,
which I'll brie¯y indicate now, that mediate against it. (These are presented
somewhat more fully in Carston 1994 and Carston & Noh 1995.)
Quotations, echoes and other representations employed for purposes other
than referring to or describing aspects of situations in the world are very
common elements of verbal communication generally, by no means con®ned
to negations. As shown in the examples in (8), this non-descriptive use of a
representation may or may not be explicitly signalled. When explicitly
signalled, by, for example, a verb of saying or quotation marks, there seems
to be no problem in grasping the proposition(s) falling in the scope of truth-
functional operators:
(9) (a) Americans say tom[eiDouz] and Brits say tom[attouz].
(b) The army slaughtered everyone in the village or, according to
them, `ethnically cleansed' it.
(c) The correct plural of `mongoose' is not `mongeese' but
`mongooses'.
We have here a conjunction, a disjunction and a negation; within the scope
of each of these operators some part of the representation is used non-
descriptively. However, there seems to be no temptation to say that, as a
result, these operators must be understood as having some interpretation
other than their standard truth-functional meaning. The truth-conditions are
clear enough in each case; for instance, (9a) is true if and only if it is the case
that Americans pronounce the word in question as tom[eiDouz] and the
British pronounce it as tom[attouz].
In the next set of examples, we are not given an encoded indication that
there is an element of non-descriptive or echoic use; this has to be
pragmatically inferred:
(10) (a) Americans eat tom[meiDouz] and Brits eat tom[attouz].
(b) The army annihilated, or ethnically cleansed, the village.
(c) They're not mongeese but mongooses.
The question to ask at this point is whether or not it is reasonable to suppose
that these operators, which are, let us assume, semantically truth-functional,
lose their truth-functionality as a result of the absence of an explicit signal
that material in their scope is being used non-descriptively. Surely not. What
sort of causal connection could there be between, on the one hand, the move
from explicit to implicit echoic use of a representation and, on the other, a
fundamental change in the interpretation of the logical operator within
whose scope the representation lies? I contend that there is none and that the
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interpretation of the operators in (10) is the same as that in (9): ordinary
descriptive truth-functional conjunction, disjunction and negation.
A further observation mediating against Horn's `I object to U'
interpretation of negation in the metalinguistic}echoic cases is that it is very
diﬃcult to see how it will accommodate the variety of encodings of negation
that we can ®nd in such cases, including `not at all', `not any more', `not
ever', `not anywhere', `neither¼nor', `it is unlikely that', `I doubt that';
this is discussed in Carston (1998: chapter 5).
3.3 Diﬀerences between Horn and Burton-Roberts on metalinguistic
negation
While the properties given in section 3.1 are typical of the examples Horn
gives when he is focusing on explicating metalinguistic negation (MN), it is
instructive to look at other parts of his extensive writing on negation where
he occasionally calls on metalinguistic negation to explain an example in the
context of some other issue altogether. For instance, he gives the following
(attested) examples in the context of a discussion of the interaction of the
existential quanti®er with negation:
(11) (a) A sociopath wouldn't get through the ®rst ten minutes of my ®lms.
They are too slow. Someone isn't killed in the credits.
(from a newspaper interview with Brian de Palma)
(b) Sheswung round, she took two strides to him, waitingfor someone
to stop her, but someone didn't.
(from John Le Carre's The Little Drummer Girl)
(Horn 1989: 494, examples (41))
It is often remarked that negation is not interpreted as taking wide scope over
the existential quanti®er and that this contrasts with its interaction with the
universal quanti®er where such an interpretation is available (e.g. `Everyone
isn't happy'). However, in the examples in (11), the existential quanti®er does
fall within the scope of negation. Horn's claim is that these are cases of
`metalinguistic or second-instance negation' (1989: 496). He reinforces this
by giving a range of further examples of the same sort where positive polarity
items fall in the scope of the negation, this being a standard diagnostic for
a metalinguistic use of negation.
What is of interest to me here is that these examples have few of the
properties mentioned above as characteristic of MN: there is no previous
utterance being echoed (though they are echoic in the wider sense expounded
above); there is no follow-up (correction) clause; there is no descriptive
contradiction; there is no double processing of the negative sentence. B-R
seems to see these as essential properties of metalinguistic negation. He takes
contradictoriness, in particular, to be a de®ning property of metalinguistic
negations; his account of the presupposition-denial cases as inevitably cases
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of MN hangs on this, as does his criticism of Horn's anti-presuppositionalist
position.
It seems, then, that they are not dealing with the same phenomenon after
all; the set of examples that falls under B-R's conception of MN is a subset
of the set that falls under Horn's conception. This diﬀerence between them
is not con®ned to examples involving the existential quanti®er; consider the
following statement from Horn: `¼any negation which takes scope over a
[sentential] conjunction, disjunction, or conditional must be metalinguistic'
(Horn 1989: 476). According to him, the following examples have to be
interpreted metalinguistically (that is, as expressing unwillingness to assert a
proposition rather than as asserting the negation of that proposition):
(12) (a) It's not the case that Chris won and Sandy lost.
(b) It is not the case that if X is given penicillin he will get better; (it
might very well have no eﬀect on him).
We may or may not agree that these are necessarily metalinguistic. Horn is
forced to take this line by his treatment of descriptive negation as a mode of
predication (predicate denial) rather than as a sentential operator. However,
the reason for pointing it out here is merely to highlight some of the
diﬀerences between Horn and B-R with regard to the way they view
metalinguistic negation and the range they give to it. For B-R (12a) would
not qualify as MN unless it occurred as follows:
(12«) (a) It's not the case that Chris won and Sandy lost; Sandy lost and
Chris won.
where the follow-up clause is semantically equivalent to the proposition
falling in the scope of the negation and the whole therefore constitutes a
contradiction. For Horn, on the other hand, this particular follow-up clause
gives just one possible ground for the MN (for the objection to the positive
conjunctive utterance); other grounds would be the falsity of the proposition
that Chris won or the falsity of the proposition that Sandy lost or the falsity
of both of them. When Horn says, as he frequently does, that MN is `a device
for objecting to a previous utterance on any grounds whatever¼'(1989:
363, my emphasis) he appears to mean it literally. While the examples that
are most often presented to illustrate MN involve an objection to some non-
truth-conditional aspect of an utterance, the grounds for MN can be the
falsity of any of the entailments (presuppositional or not) of the proposition
expressed by that utterance.
What emerges from this is that for Horn, as for me (see Carston 1994), it
is possible for one and the same negative sentence (with or without a follow-
upclause)tobeunderstoodasdescriptiveinonecontextandasmetalinguistic
in another. This depends, in my view, on whether or not the material within
the scope of the negation is being used descriptively or echoically. For B-R,
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on the other hand, these options appear to be mutually exclusive. If we were
to con®ne our attention to examples such as those in (4), he might seem to
be correct, because these cases, which focus on some aspect of linguistic
form, are indeed contradictory if understood descriptively. It is the, rather
idiosyncratic, properties of these cases that B-R depends on when he
contends that if presupposition-denials (e.g. (1)±(3)) are understood
metalinguistically, as Horn says, then that is because they can only be
understoodinthatway.Aswiththeexamplesin(4),takingthemdescriptively
yields a contradiction. The essential point for B-R is that this provides strong
evidence for his semantic presuppositional account since it is only on this
account that these examples are found to have these characteristic properties
of MN, thereby making it possible to give a uni®ed account of the class of
metalinguistic negations. It follows from this view that in order to be
consistent we must all convert to semantic presuppositionalism.
In the next section I will complete this outline of B-R's position and review
the dilemma that he claims Horn's mixed allegiances lead him into.
4.T he Burton-Roberts package and Horn's dilemma
4.1 The interdependence of metalinguistic negation and presupposition?
The last section pointed up some diﬀerences in the range of cases that B-R
and Horn admit into the class of metalinguistic negation. The following
cannot be cases of MN for B-R because they are not semantic contradictions:
(13) (a) She didn't ¯aunt the rules; she ¯outed them.
(b) He doesn't need four mats; he needs more fats.
(c) I didn't put him up; I put up with him.
Note that they have all the other characteristic properties of the standard
cases of metalinguistic negation: they are most easily contextualised as
rejoinders to (corrections of) an utterance of the corresponding positive; the
negative utterance is followed by a recti®cation clause; if spoken they would
be naturally intoned with the `contradiction' contour and take contrastive
stress on the oﬀending item and its replacement. The representation of the
oﬀending item is readily taken to be echoic, the essential property, I have
argued, of metalinguistic cases. They may or may not garden-path a reader;
this is always possible when echoic or metarepresentational use is not
signalled explicitly, though in an appropriate context their non-descriptive
nature may be accessed by the reader}hearer on a ®rst pass. Kempson (1986),
Foolen (1991) and Horn (1989, 1992) all take examples of this sort to be
metalinguistic; B-R alone excludes them.
The examples in (13) seem to involve linguistic mistakes (perhaps slips of
the tongue) so that the correction clauses bear no particular informational
relation to the presumed positive utterances. Consider now the following
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examples where there is a closer informational relation between the
proposition expressed in the correction clause and the proposition expressed
by the presumed positive utterance or thought:
(14) (a) A: Are you going to sack him?
B: I'm not going to sack him; I'm going to kill him.
(b) A: That letter must reach Bill by tomorrow at the latest. I hope
you've put it in the mail.
B: I haven't put it in the mail; I've delivered it to him by hand.
The rhetorical nature of these is the same as that which Horn and B-R point
out when discussing the standard cases of MN; they are in the format of the
original examples in (4) and they have the special eﬀects that come from ®rst
interpreting the negative sentence as wholly descriptive and then, on the basis
of the recti®cation clause, having to backtrack and reanalyse as echoic. (14a),
which occurred on a television sitcom and raised a laugh from the audience,
is a typical garden-pathing joke. But these are not cases of contradiction so,
for B-R, they cannot be cases of metalinguistic negation, for a literal
contradiction, provided semantically, is required to provide the rationale for
the pragmatic reanalysis, on his view (B-R 1989b:232, 235). Killing someone
does not entail sacking him; delivering a letter by hand does not entail
putting it in the mail. The property these examples, and countless others we
could construct, have is that the proposition expressed in the correction
clause is conceived of as stronger (in the sense of having more contextual
implications) than the proposition that the positive counterpart of the
negative sentence would express: killing someone is more extreme than
sacking him, delivering a letter by hand on a particular day is a better means
of ensuring it reaches its destination by the next day than is putting it in the
mail. The scale of degrees of informational strength here is pragmatic rather
than semantic. I have argued at greater length in Carston (1994) that it is a
mistake to try to pin MN down to a phenomenon with any particular
semantic property when taken descriptively, as B-R does; it is a pragmatic
matter and as such deeply sensitive to the particularities of context. I think
these examples demonstrate this point very well; they are patently cases of
MN, cases that even have the special rhetorical eﬀects that have all too often
been taken to be the essence of the phenomenon.
B-R, however, is committed to the semantically contradictory nature of
instances of metalinguistic negation; this requirement is the foundation of
the edi®ce he subsequently builds, in which a presuppositional semantics and
metalinguistic negation are mutually reinforcing. Horn and many others are
in agreement with him that the presupposition-denial cases are instances of
MN:
(15) A: The President of New Zealand is young.
B: The President of New Zealand is not young; New Zealand doesn't
have a president.
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This is not a mere interpretive possibility for B-R but a necessity, since these
are cases of semantic contradiction on his presuppositional account: taken
descriptively, B would be communicating both that there is a president of
New Zealand and that there isn't one. On the basis of his claim that the
unifying property of MN is its logical contradictoriness, B-R is able to
adduce strong support for his presuppositional semantics:
Since I, with Horn and others, take the whole Set III [i.e. the
presupposition-denial examples in (1)±(3) together with the examples in
(4)] to constitute a homogeneous set of metalinguistic negations, it is of
some importance to capture the generalisation that the motivation for the
pragmatic analysis invited by this use of negation stems from the need to
resolve a truth-conditional contradiction. On a presuppositional sem-
antics, and only on a presuppositional semantics, this generalisation holds
good of all the cited examples.¼a properly general and explanatory
account of metalinguistic negation itself implies a presuppositional
semantics.
(B-R 1989b: 235, my emphasis)
I have just cast some doubt on the generalisation that MNs are
contradictions. While it is an interesting fact that many of the most often
cited cases of MN are semantic contradictions, there is no evidence that the
properties of this subset of cases of MN should be taken as embodying the
essence of MN. Their obvious contradictoriness makes their metalinguistic
interpretation particularly salient, even out of any context, and so they are
especially useful for exempli®catory purposes, but we shouldn't let their
salience and eﬀectiveness mislead us into thinking that their particular
featuresde®nea naturalclass (seeCarston(1994:319) forfurther discussion).
In section 5, I will show that, whatever the case may be for MN generally,
the evidence is strong that presupposition-denials are not contradictions. As
should be clear from the foregoing, if this is true it brings about a total
unravelling of the tightly interwoven threads of B-R's story. We are not
there yet, though; we need to draw the other participants, especially Horn,
back into the tale.
4.2 Horn's (alleged) dilemma
`Gricean' accounts of the presupposition-denial cases take them to be
adequately covered by the semantics of negation, which is P-cancelling and
so does not require any pragmatic inferential work. This is a logically
consistent view, but, as B-R, Horn and other have pointed out, it completely
fails to account for the universally agreed sense of markedness, the special
eﬀects, that these cases have, and the equally agreed view that the most
natural contextualisation is that on which they are taken as rejoinders to a
(potential) utterance of the corresponding positive.
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However, Horn (1985, 1989), who certainly counts himself among the anti-
presuppositionalists and advocates a semantically wide scope predicate
denial negation, seems to think (1)±(3) are metalinguistic negations. Indeed
he begins his in¯uential 1985 paper on metalinguistic negation with the
standard example of an `external' or `marked' negation, (1) above, repeated
here,
(16) The king of France is not bald (because) there is no king of France.
and claims that both the existing semantic ambiguity accounts and the
`Gricean' univocality accounts in terms of a wide scope (P-cancelling) truth-
functional negation operator are seriously ¯awed. He proceeds to dem-
onstrate a range of cases of negative utterances which seem to require a
special metalinguistic use of the negation operator (examples such as those
in (4)) and claims that, while negation may be univocal and truth-functional
as regards its semantics, it is pragmatically ambiguous. Horn's important
claim for the topic of this paper is that `external, presupposition-cancelling
negation is part of [this] wider phenomenon characterized as the use of
negation to signal¼the speaker's objection to the content or form associated
with a given utterance' (Horn 1985: 122).
On the face of it, Horn's position does seems to entail a pointless
redundancy: P-cancellation can apparently be achieved in two ways, the one
semantic and the other pragmatic. In addition to the intrinsic undesirability
of such redundancy in a theory, it leaves an explanatory gap: if the bare
output of semantics gives you P-cancellation (for free as it were) how does
P-cancellation ever get to be a case of metalinguistic negation, which both
Horn and B-R agree it is? Given this semantics, it is only P-preservation that
has to be derived pragmatically. Horn avoids putting the diﬀerent parts of
his position together and looking at their implications, so that he does not
appear to notice this issue. However, the analysis of presupposition-denials,
such as (1)±(3), that I oﬀer in section 6 is one which accommodates the fact
that they are typically interpreted as cases of metalinguistic (or `echoic')
negation while, nonetheless, employing a negation operator which is
semantically P-cancelling. If this analysis is right, it shows that, after all,
Horn's position, drastically under-articulated though it is, is essentially right.
A dilemma created by a redundancy is one thing, but a dilemma forced by
incoherence is another matter, a far more serious one, that urgently calls for
a choice between the opposed positions. It is this that B-R charges Horn
with:
Horn's dilemma in essence was this: having noticed that such `P-
cancellations' intuitively and functionally cohere with other cases of an
independent pragmatic phenomenon of metalinguistic negation, Horn
(1985)¼wished to include P-cancellation among the functions of his
pragmatic, metalinguistic negation. But this, I argued [in B-R 1989a, b], is
only explanatory and coherent, and indeed possible, if P-can-
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cellation is not achieved in the semantics [my emphasis]. Now, theories
in which P-cancellation is not achieved in the semantics are by de®nition
semantic theories of presupposition. But Horn (1985) wished to join the
anti-presuppositionalists in denying the existence of semantic presup-
position in any shape or form.
(B-R 1990: 460±461)
While he disagrees with the `Gricean' position, set out in section 2, B-R
accepts it as an internally consistent and coherent position. He considers
Horn, on the other hand, to be trying to straddle two diﬀerent positions with
a result of incoherence. The claim is that Horn's various commitments
pull him in two opposing, irreconcilable directions: he is simultaneously
an (avowed) anti-presuppositionalist and an (unavowed) pro-
presuppositionalist. These horns are not equally explicit or salient in Horn's
work, of course. While he is explicit about his opposition to semantic
presupposition, his pro-presuppositionalism is an unrecognised consequence
of his commitment to a metalinguistic negation account of the
presupposition-denial cases. Again, it is a result of my analysis in section 6
that there is no inconsistency in both refusing to take up the semantic
presupposition calling and agreeing that the negation in the presupposition-
denial cases is standardly interpreted as operating over metarepresented
material, an interpretation that inevitably involves pragmatic inference.
According to B-R, the metalinguistic account involves a process of
pragmatic reanalysis which is only possible `if P-cancellation is not achieved
in the semantics', that is, it requires a prior semantico-logical analysis on
which negation is presupposition-preserving. It follows that the presup-
position relation itself must be semantic; a unitary account of metalinguistic
negation implies a presuppositional semantics. Certainly, if B-R were right
about this, Horn's position would be untenable. I shall argue, however, that
he is not right, that he has created the appearance of a dilemma by setting
up an unwarranted and unargued-for body of precepts about the nature of
semantics and pragmatics and the relation between them. In particular, I
shall take issue with his assumption that the result of a process of pragmatic
inference must be a representation which accounts for a distinct range of
cases from those that the underlying sentence semantics covers. I will take up
this `semantic-pragmatic disjunction thesis', as we may call it, in section 7.
The following schematic summary highlights the diﬀerences between the








5.` P resupposition'-denials: neither contradictory nor
necessarily metalinguistic
It follows from B-R's overall presuppositional theory that P-denial cases
should be descriptive contradictions. Much hangs on the correctness of this
conclusion, including at least the following propositions: (i) P-denials are
necessarily metalinguistic (they fall outside the descriptive power of the
language system); (ii) the correct analysis of negations of `presuppositional'
sentences requires a negation operator that is semantically incapable of
cancelling presuppositions; and so (iii) consistency demands that anyone
who includes P-denials in the class of MN, for instance, Horn, must embrace
a semantic account of presuppositions. If the contradiction claim is incorrect
then all of this collapses; indeed, since the claim is a consequence of the
general presuppositional theory, it must be bad news for some, at least, of the
premises of that theory. In this section I do little more than gather together
evidence, already presented in diﬀerent places by various writers (pro- and
anti-presuppositionalist), which mounts a very strong case for the non-
contradictory nature of the `presupposition'-denial cases. I draw on
Kempson (1986), Seuren (1988, 1990), Horn (1990) and Turner (1992).
5.1 Evidence against the contradictoriness of P-denials
As a ®rst observation, notice that the `correction' clause in the `pre-
suppositional' cases (as opposed to the `standard' cases, given in (4)) is
always a negative; it is of course the negation of a presupposition (or, as an
anti-presuppositionalist would prefer to say, of an `entailment') of the
positive counterpart of the negative sentence under consideration. This is
interesting because it indicates that what the `correction' clause is doing is
making it clear to the hearer which one of the truth-conditions}entailments
of the positive sentence is to be taken as the grounds for the negation. This
is not a point against B-R's semantic contradiction view since, while both
presuppositions and ordinary (strong) entailments contribute to truth-
conditions, presuppositions, on his view, are a special sort of truth-condition
in that they are not cancelled under negation. On the view I would argue for,
however, at the descriptive (semantic) level the `correction' clause in the
`presuppositional' cases is more akin to the `speci®cation' clause in the
following cases:
(17) (a) I didn't pass all my exams and get a good job; I only passed ®ve
out of the six.
(b) He didn't butter the toast with a knife in the bathroom at
midnight; he used a toothbrush.
What the follow-up clauses do in these examples is specify which of the
entailments of the corresponding positive sentence is false and so make
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explicit the grounds for the negation in the ®rst clause. There are, of course,
strongly felt intuitive diﬀerences between these examples and the P-denials;
the reader}hearer is not so likely to `misinterpret' the negative sentence on
a ®rst pass as s}he is in the case of a P-denial, so these do not feel as marked
as the P-denials. However, this diﬀerence is consistent with an anti-
presuppositionalist view, I would argue, in that it can be explained as purely
a matter of pragmatic processing (rather than anything to do with the
semantics of the sentences). In (17a) there is no pragmatic narrowing of the
negation to one of the conjuncts, whereas in the presuppositional cases there
is a very common process of narrowing to exclude the presupposition (P-
preserving negation); while the existential implication is standardly back-
grounded relative to the other entailments, the two conjuncts in (17a) are
equally foregrounded so that neither is more likely to be the focus of the
negation than the other. (17b) is interesting in that it seems to fall somewhere
between (17a) and P-denials with regard to markedness}garden-pathing.
Abstracting away from particular directives given by particular stress
patterns, the most natural, though not inevitable, interpretation is the one on
which the ®nal constituent, `at midnight', is the focus of the negation, an
analysis which has to be revised in the light of the follow-up clause. My point
is that all three cases (the two in (17) and the P-denial examples) have a clause
following up the negative sentence which makes explicit which of the
entailments of the corresponding positive is the false one and this is
consistent with a wholly descriptive interpretation.
I shall move on now to some groups of data which are aimed at sowing
increasing doubt about the alleged contradictoriness of the P-denials and,
®nally, at showing it to be simply wrong. The general strategy is to take
`standard' cases of metalinguistic negation (such as the examples in (4)),
show that they have some property, and then check the P-denials for the
same property, revealing that they do not have it. The property in question
obviously has to be one that we should expect a descriptive contradiction to
have. Consider the following examples (adapted from Seuren (1988: 195) and
Horn (1990: 498)).
(18) (a) !It's not true that he's picking up the kids; he's picking up the
children.
(b) !It's not true that she's pleased with the outcome; she's thrilled
about it.
(c) !It's not true that we saw some hippopotamuses; we saw some
hippopotami.
(d) !It's not true that he's my father; I'm his daughter.
(e) It's not true that the king of France is bald; there is no king of
France.
Here the phrase `it's not true that' has replaced `not', the idea being that the
explicit occurrence of the word `true' should make a metalinguistic
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interpretation considerably more diﬃcult to get at, as it keeps the
reader}hearer in the realm of directly truth-conditional (literal}descriptive)
representation. Assuming agreement with regard to the judgements marked
by `!', it does seem that there is diﬃculty in interpreting (18a±d): there is a
con¯ict between the explicitly expressed interest in what the truth of the
matter is and the subsequent pair of clauses which, if treated truth-
conditionally, as is apparently required, are contradictory. This is not the
case for (18e) which is ®ne: the explicitly encoded concern with how things
are with the world is apparently followed by a perfectly consistent description
of how things are.
The same results would pertain for paraphrases using `it is false that P'
and some readers might ®nd this paraphrase more eﬀective in prompting the
intuitions I am trying to elicit here. There may, however, be some people who
are not impressed by this, who would say that (18a±d) can be interpreted
quite readily, as something like `It's not okay}right}appropriate to say¼'.
Such people, I would claim, are understanding `true}false' as loosely used,
as not restricted to literal truth and falsehood (correspondence or non-
correspondence to the way things are in the world) but as communicating
something like `okay to say}not okay to say'. However, such a loose
interpretation is not necessary for (18e) which is interpretable as involving
absolutely literal use of `true}false'. There does seem to be a genuine
distinction here between the truly contradictory metalinguistic cases and the
P-denials: having checked the intuitions of several groups of students, I have
found that many people who ®nd the metalinguistic negation examples in (4)
quiteacceptable do not ®ndthese`nottrue}false' casesin (18a±d) acceptable,
and that those (few) who ®nd the `not true}false' cases acceptable agree that
they are not as immediately okay as the plain `not' cases.
A further indication against the contradiction account comes from a point
made by Kempson (1986: 85) concerning the possibility of an evidential
interpretation of the second clause.
(19) (a) He didn't see the sign: he was looking the wrong way.
(b) We didn't see some mongeese; we saw some mongooses.
(c) She didn't eat some of the cakes; she ate all of them.
(d) I'm not his daughter; he's my father.
(e) The king of France isn't bald: France doesn't have a king.
(f) She hasn't stopped drinking: she has never been a drinker.
Descriptively used negations, like descriptively used positives, are often
followed by a clause which provides evidence for the belief expressed in
uttering the ®rst clause. (19a) is a clear case of this: that he was looking the
wrong way provides evidence for my belief}assertion that he didn't see the
sign. However, when we move to (19b±d), some of the cases standardly cited
as readily giving rise to a metalinguistic interpretation, we ®nd the second
clause does not have this function. The fact that we saw some mongooses is
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not evidence that we didn't see some mongeese; even more clearly, the fact
that she ate all of the cakes is not evidence for the belief expressed by the
preceding negation, but is, in fact, strong evidence for its opposite, that she
has eaten some of the cakes, and the same goes for (19d). The evidential
relation is one that is rooted in the way events and states of aﬀairs connect
up in the world, in temporal, causal and other relations to each other. It is
not surprising that this is not how the metalinguistic negations and their
follow-up clauses are understood, because they are, precisely, not making
statements about the way things are in the extra-linguistic world. What then
of the P-denials in (19e±f)? As with (19a), an evidential relation is readily
taken to hold between the second clause and the ®rst. The fact that France
doesn't have a king is excellent evidence in support of the contention that the
king of France isn't bald. In line with this, these two cases, like (19a) and
unlike the unequivocally metalinguistic cases, can be conjoined by a causal
connective such as `because' or `since', a point which I leave the reader to
check, and which is taken up again at the end of section 5.2.
A ®nal piece of evidence (not noted by anyone else to my knowledge)
against the logical contradiction idea is that the very property that led to the
standard metalinguistic cases being called `paradoxical negations' does not
seem to extend to the `presupposition'-denial cases. The more general
property lying behind this is that for any two descriptive statements, P and
Q, which are contradictory, whether involving negation or not, each entails
the negation of the other:
(20) (a) She murdered him; he's still alive. (P; Q)
(b) If she murdered him he is not still alive.
(If P then not Q)
(b«) If he is still alive she didn't murder him.
(If Q then not P)
AsHorn(1989:431±432),followingCormack(1980),pointsout,thestandard
metalinguistic negations seem to be paradoxical because their positive
counterparts are entailed by their correction clause. That is, given the
schematic representation of these examples as ``Not R; Q'', the following
seems to be the case ``Since}if Q, then R'':
(21) (a) I'm not happy; I'm ecstatic.
(a«) Since}if I'm ecstatic, I'm (certainly) happy.
(b) I'm not his child; he's my father.
(b«) If he is my father then I am his child.
(c) The king of France isn't bald; there isn't a king of France.
(c«) !Since there isn't a king of France, the king of France is bald.
(d) Kim doesn't regret inviting Bob to her party; Bob gate-
crashed}she didn't invite him.
(d«) !If Kim didn't invite Bob to her party then she regrets inviting
him.
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(21a) and (21b) exhibit the same property as the examples in (20), a
consequence of being descriptive contradictions. (21c) and (21d), on the
other hand, do not; in fact, they seem to have the contrary property in that
this very manipulation gives rise to a contradiction, as is the case for any
other instance of denying an entailment:
(22) (a) The king of France isn't bald; he has long black hair.
(a«) !If the king of France has long black hair then the king of France
is bald.
(b) Kim doesn't regret inviting Bob to her party; she is glad he came.
(b«) !If Kim is glad that Bob came to her party she regrets inviting him.
The evidence, then, overwhelmingly, is that the juxtaposition of a negative
`presuppositional' sentence with a sentence which negates its (or one of its)
presupposition(s) does not constitute a semantic contradiction. This is a
serious problem for B-R's semantic `presupposition' position. Not only is it
false that `a properly general account of metalinguistic negation implies a
presuppositional semantics' (see section 4.1) but, worse than that, if he is
right in claiming that it is only on a presuppositional semantics that (1)±(3)
are predicted to be contradictory and, as it now seems, this is a false
prediction, his semantics is in trouble. However strong his other arguments
for a presuppositional semantics may be, he has a major problem on his
hands in accounting for (1)±(3).
Note that one problem that is NOT created by the non-contradictory
nature of these examples is a puncturing of the claim that the unifying
property of MN is its contradictory nature. This claim has already been
shown to be incorrect (see section 4.1); there are many examples of MN, in
addition to the presupposition-denial cases, which are not semantic
contradictions. Furthermore, as I'll show in the next section, it is not
inevitable that P-denials are interpreted metalinguistically.
5.2 Are `presupposition'-denials necessarily metalinguistic?
As discussed above, B-R's account is a package: all MNs are contradictions;
P-denials are cases of MN so they too are contradictions; it is this that
triggers the move to the MN interpretation. If he is persuaded by the
arguments in the previous section that the presupposition-denial cases are
notcontradictory,hewillhavetoabandontheviewthatthe`presupposition'-
denials are necessarily metalinguistic. However, B-R's intuition that these
cases are understood as metalinguistic}echoic is widely shared. A reasonable
conclusion, made available by relaxing the contradiction requirement on
MN, would be that while they are standardly metalinguistic in use they are
not metalinguistic as a matter of logical necessity. Just what this means in
practice may not be obvious yet, but the account I spell out in the next
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section will illustrate it. It is this that in fact underlies Horn's alleged
dilemma: P-denials ARE understood metalinguistically, but this is prag-
matically motivated rather than being forced by a presuppositional
semantics.
Let us look now at some of the further evidence that B-R marshals to
support his claim that the cancellation of the presupposition is achieved by
metalinguistic negation and only by metalinguistic negation. This is of some
interest here since if the `metalinguistic but not necessarily metalinguistic'
line is correct this evidence should only support a strong tendency and not
a necessity.
Horn gives several `diagnostics' for the presence of a metalinguistic
negation, including: (i) the inability of metalinguistic negation to incorporate
pre®xally, and (ii) its failure to trigger negative polarity items (NPIs). These
are evident in the following examples:
(23) (a) Mary is not happy; she's ecstatic.
(b) !Mary is unhappy; she's ecstatic.
(c) He's isn't tall or handsome; he's tall and handsome.
(d) !He's neither tall nor handsome; he's tall and handsome.
(24) (a) He is sometimes diﬃcult.
(b) !He isn't ever diﬃcult; he is always diﬃcult.
(c) He isn't sometimes diﬃcult; he is always diﬃcult.
The marked examples here can only be understood descriptively and, as a
result, they are ruled out because they are contradictory.
B-R points out that these two diagnostics apply to the P-denial cases,
thereby giving further support for his view that they are necessarily
metalinguistic (on a noncontradictory understanding). Let's look at each of
these in turn. B-R (1989b:236) uses (25a±b) to show that the ®rst diagnostic
for MN is met by the P-denial cases; Horn (1989: 392) also gives those
examples, together with (25c±d):
(25) (a) The king of France is not happy ± there is no king of France.
(b) !The king of France is unhappy ± there is no king of France.
(c) The queen of England is not happy ± she's ecstatic.
(d) !The queen of England is unhappy ± she's ecstatic.
The claim is that the morphologically incorporated negation in (25b) and
(25d) does not allow a metalinguistic reading, and so the only interpretation
is a descriptive one, which is contradictory and so not acceptable. But there
is an important diﬀerence between the two examples. First, note that
`unhappy' is a case of term negation, that is, the examples with `unhappy'
are affirmative predications of a negative term, whereas the descriptive
uses of `not happy' are predicate denials, that is denials of the applicability
of the term `happy' to the subject term. See Horn (1989: 40±43) for
discussion of this important distinction. Now, in (25b) we could substitute
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for `unhappy' any predicate term under the sun (or leave it blank) and still
get the same result, that is, a contradiction:
(26) (a) !The king of France is sad}healthy}bald}impolite}undressed}etc;
there is no king of France.
(b) !The king of France is¼¼¼; there isn't any king of France.
This is not so in the case of (25d), where only those predicate terms which are
semantically antonymous with `ecstatic' will give rise to a contradiction
(some of the others might result in an odd utterance ± one whose relevance
is diﬃcult to discern ± but not a contradiction).
The point is that the utterances which deny the existence of the king of
France ((25b) and (26)) do not meet a basic requirement of any aﬃrmative
predication (whether of a positive or a negative term) which is that its subject
should denote something (this is an entailment of these positive sentences).
Thus while it is undoubtedly true that negative pre®xes cannot be used
metalinguistically (cannot take metarepresentational material in their scope)
and that example (25b) is contradictory, these two facts are independent of
each other in this example. In short, these facts do not establish that P-denial
cases are inevitably metalinguistic.
Let's move to the second diagnostic, the inability of metalinguistic
negation to trigger NPIs. (It is discussed and tightened up in Chapman 1993
and Carston 1998.) Naturally, B-R (1989b: 236) wants to show that the P-
denial cases cannot trigger NPIs, since if they cannot do this the negative
presuppositional sentences must be being used metalinguistically. In looking
at his examples, given in (27)±(31), there are two questions to consider. First,
is it true that (27)±(31) are unacceptable, as B-R claims? Second, if we do ®nd
them odd, is this because they MUST, due to the unavailability of a
noncontradictory semantics, be interpreted metalinguistically.
(27) !The king of France couldn't care less ± there is no king of France.
(28) !The king of France doesn't give a damn}hoot ± there is no king of
France.
(29) !The king of France isn't lifting a ®nger; there is no king of France.
(30) !The king of France hasn't lost any hair yet; there is no king of France.
(31) The king of France hasn't lost some hair already; there is no king of
France.
(B-R 1989b: 236)
The idea, recall, is that these NPIs force a descriptive reading, since they
cannot occur in the positive sentences to which a metalinguistic use would be
an appropriate rejoinder, for example:
(32) (a) !The king of France could care less.
(b) !The king of France has lost any hair yet.
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So we are really pushed back here to the issue of whether or not these are
descriptive contradictions. I've given a lot of evidence that they are not and
a comparison of the alleged unacceptability of (27)±(31) with the following
cases merely reinforces this:
(33) (a) !!I don't ever see John; I see him every day.
(b) !!I didn't eat any of the cakes; I ate all of them.
(c) !!She hasn't arrived yet; she's been here all day.
While the nonexistence of a king of France seems an odd reason for denying
some property of him, since it renders it pointless (irrelevant), this is not of
the same order of unacceptability as the examples in (33), which really are
descriptive contradictions.
I shall end this section by brie¯y considering another problem that B-R is
led into by his insistence that P-denials are contradictions and must be
interpreted metalinguistically (it is discussed at slightly greater length by
Horn 1990). B-R notes the following possibility:
(34) The king of France isn't bald, because there is no king of France!
and claims that this involves a `special metalinguistic use of because
operating on ``the same level'', as it were, as that [metalinguistic] use of
negation' (B-R 1989b:237). He believes that the same special use of because
arises in the second of the following examples:
(35) (a) John has got his hat on because he is going out.
(b) John is going out because he has his hat on.
(35a) is an instance of the standard semantic analysis of because: `P because
Q' maps onto `Q is a suﬃcient cause or reason for P' and `Why P? For the
simple reason that Q'. Mappings of this sort give a bizarre result for (35b);
for instance, `Why is John going out? (For the simple reason that) he has his
hat on'. In this example, the `because Q' clause is most naturally understood
as providing an explanation of the speaker's reason for saying that John is
going out; this is what, according to B-R, makes it metalinguistic. The
appropriate mapping here would be to `Why do you believe}say that P? For
the reason that (I believe that) Q'.
If B-R is right about P-denials, applying the ®rst sort of transformation to
them should give a bizarre result, while the second sort should be acceptable.
Let's see:
(36) (a) Why is the king of France not bald? For the simple reason that
there is no king of France.
(b) Why do you believe}say that the king of France is not bald? For
the reason that (I know) there is no king of France.
They both seem quite okay. This is just what we should expect if, as I believe
I've shown, there is no semantic necessity (no contradiction) forcing these to
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be construed metalinguistically, though they are, as a matter of normal
communicative use of natural language, most frequently understood
metalinguistically. The because in (34) may be understood as having scope
over either a descriptively or metarepresentationally used representation; B-
R's assumption that it can only be used metalinguistically is a byproduct of
his erroneous view that the P-denials are descriptive contradictions and that
their only coherent interpretation is metalinguistic}echoic.
There are two further issues of interest here, which I merely mention. The
®rst, pointed out by Horn (1990: 499), is that other cases of metalinguistic
negation seem less amenable to because conjunction than the P-denials,
reinforcing further the diﬀerence between them:
(37) (a) !The glass isn't half-empty because it's half-full.
(b) !I didn't shoot two mongooses because I shot two mongeese.
(c) !Grandma isn't feeling lousy, Johnny, because she's badly
indisposed.
The second concerns the broad way in which the term `metalinguistic' is
used, both by B-R here, and by Horn (1989: 379±382) in his discussion of so-
called metalinguistic uses of other operators, including disjunction, con-
junction, the conditional and questions. It is not obvious that the use of
because in (35b), giving a reason for a belief or a speech act of the speaker,
is `metalinguistic' in the same sense as it is in the negations we've been
looking at, where the crucial ingredient is the echoic or metarepresentational
nature of material in the scope of the operator. This whole area needs a lot
more examination.'
The conclusions of this section are: (i) P-denials are not linguistic
contradictions.ThisisamajorproblemforB-R'spresuppositionalsemantics.
However, contrary to B-R's interdependence view, contradictoriness is not a
necessary feature of MN. So this point turns out to have no direct bearing
on the issue of whether P-denials are or are not understood meta-
linguistically; (ii) They are most naturally contextualised as rejoinders to a
[6] The issue is especially striking in the context of accounts of conditionals where the term
metalinguistic has been used of cases as disparate as the following:
(i) If you're thirsty, there's some beer in the fridge.
(ii) If I may say so, you look better in the red dress.
(iii) If the Cite is the heart of Paris, the Latin Quarter is its soul.
(from Horn 1989: 380)
(iv) I'll have a tom[a:tou], if that's how you pronounce it.
(v) John managed to solve the problem, if it was at all diﬃcult.
(from Dancygier 1992)
(vi) If you eat tom[eiDouz] you must be American.
(vii) If that glass is half empty you are a pessimist. (from Noh 1996)
Interesting discussion of these sorts of examples occurs in Sweetser (1990), Dancygier
(1992) and Noh (1996), where it seems generally agreed that speech act conditionals and
metalinguistic conditionals are distinct sorts of cases.
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prior or anticipated utterance of the positive counterpart of the negation
(hence understood metalinguistically), and so tend not to trigger negative
polarity items, though this is not an absolute.
What, then, of the strong pretheoretic intuition that there is some tension,
if not contradiction, between the ®rst clause and the second, and that they
do, frequently at least, require double processing? The analysis I give in the
next section, which involves a simple extension to the standard anti-
presuppositional `Gricean' analysis, accounts for both of these facts.
6.Acognitive pragmatic account of presupposition-
denials
My recasting and extending of the `Gricean' account is set within the
cognitive pragmatic framework of Sperber & Wilson's Relevance Theory.
While I do not intend to add to the many comprehensive outlines of that
framework that are now available, I shall take the next section to foreground
some of the commitments of the relevance-theoretic perspective on cognition
and communication which have a bearing on my subsequent analysis.
6.1 Relevance-theoretic pragmatics
Human cognitive activity is relevance-oriented, that is, it is geared towards
achieving cognitive effects, towards processing information which will
connect up with our existing representations of the world in certain sorts of
extending and deepening ways. It is also geared towards keeping processing
costs down, to allocating its limited attentional and inferential resources in
an eﬃcient way. The interpretation of utterances is just a particular case of
this sort of cognitive activity. However, utterances are a special sort of
stimulus in two respects:
A. They are ostensive: they make an overt demand on the hearer's
attention, hence his processing resources, and thereby create an expectation
that they will achieve a certain level of relevance, known as `optimal
relevance'. So an addressee of an utterance looks for an interpretation of it
which has the following two properties:
(I) It achieves at least enough contextual eﬀects to be worth his attention.
(II) It puts him no gratuitous processing eﬀort in achieving those eﬀects.
B. They employ a code, a language, which directs and constrains the
inferential processing of the hearer. This coded element is obviously hugely
enabling; it allows speakers to achieve a degree of explicitness, clarity and
detail not possible in non-verbal communication (try communicating the
proposition expressed by (II) above without using a language).
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However, the linguistic expressions used on any given occasion of
utterance virtually never fully determine what the utterance communicates:
there is always a range of possible interpretations which are compatible with
the information that is linguistically encoded. I'm referring here not just to
the communication of implicatures but also to the proposition explicitly
expressed (`what is said') by the utterance. The role of pragmatics in deriving
the proposition expressed is far from exhausted by the processes of reference
assignment and disambiguation; a great deal of the conceptual material
which makes up the truth-conditional content of the utterance is prag-
matically inferred. This view, generally known as the linguistic (or semantic)
underdeterminacy thesis, is expounded and extensively exempli®ed in
Carston (1988, 1998), Atlas (1989), Recanati (1989, 1994) and Bach (1994).
Although it is not peculiar to the relevance-theoretic approach to
pragmatics, it is more intrinsic to, follows more directly from, the sort of
cognitive outlook of this theory than from any other I know of (Atlas and
Recanati, for instance, do not develop pragmatic theories of any sort, but
assume that something like Gricean maxims will do). Given the relevance-
driven propensity, compulsion even, of humans for inferential interpretive
activity, triggered both by the inanimate phenomena of the world and by
animate `behaving' phenomena, in particular fellow humans, this capacity is
especially likely to be exercised when prompted by ostensive stimuli. Their
overt demand for attention can only be justi®ed by a presumption (or
promise) of cognitive fruitfulness (optimal relevance). It follows that the
coded element of the stimulus should not generally be geared towards
achieving as high a degree of explicitness as possible, but should rather take
accountofthehearer'simmediatelyaccessibleassumptionsandtheinferences
he can readily draw. When a speaker occasionally fails to take this into
account, or gets it wrong, she causes her hearer unnecessary processing eﬀort
(for instance, pointless decoding of concepts which are already activated, or
highly accessible to him), and runs the risk of not being understood or, at the
least, of being found boring and}or patronising, insulting, etc.
A foundational assumption, then, of my own work, within the relevance-
theoretic framework, is that utterance interpretation is essentially an
inferential matter which involves a bit of helpful semantic decoding to
channel the inferencing processes. Pragmatic inferencing may start before the
speaker has articulated her ®rst word, may be prompted by an (ostensive)
silence on the part of a prospective conversational participant, but will
certainly be set in motion by the automatic deliverances of linguistic
decoding.
The hearer's inferential capacities not only recover implicated propositions
but also resolve linguistic ambiguities, vaguenesses, and referential indeter-
minacies at the level of the proposition expressed. One of the many
indeterminacies to be settled is whether the linguistic representations of the
utterance (phonological, syntactic, logical) or its propositional form are
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being used in a basic way (descriptively in the case of a propositional
representation) or metarepresentationally (perhaps echoically). If the speaker
has judged the hearer's cognitive contextual resources right, the hearer will
achieve all this with less mental eﬀort than would be required by a more
linguistically explicit utterance (that is, one involving a greater degree of
semantic encoding) expressing the same proposition.
It might be worth mentioning two fairly obvious points that follow from
this particular cognitive pragmatic view (of a system constantly seeking
satisfaction for its eﬀorts). First, if the speaker has left implicit something
which could have easily been made explicit and if this leads a hearer to incur
extra processing costs, the hearer is entitled to expect extra eﬀects. Garden-
pathing cases, including the descriptive-metalinguistic paths above, are clear
illustrations of this; the eﬀort involved in taking the one path and then
having to backtrack and take another is usually oﬀset by the eﬀects it has
(often of amusement). Second, the order in which material is presented has
a considerable eﬀect on the interpretation process. A constituent of linguistic
encoding is processed in the context of, among other things, assumptions
made available by concepts decoded earlier in the text or utterance, so that,
in general, the order of clauses (whether conjoined or juxtaposed) aﬀects
what gets communicated, while leaving the semantics of the clauses
untouched. We saw this already with examples (5) and (6) and its importance
for the interpretation of P-denials will be shown shortly.(
Thesemanticunderdeterminacyviewisnotsharedbyallotherpragmatists,
and few who acknowledge it hold it in quite as strong a form as the relevance
theorists. B-R (1989a, b), for instance, tends toward a rather diﬀerent
weighting of the relative contributions of semantics and pragmatics to
utterance interpretation. He favours a heavier element of decoding and tends
to look to pragmatics only when the output of the linguistic decoding is
defective or insuﬃcient in some way. I shall take up these diﬀerences in the
last section of the paper.
6.2 The two pragmatic level account of P-denials
Recall the two main analyses of (1)±(3) on oﬀer:
A. The Gricean analysis. The semantics of negation is maximally wide in
scope (uncommitted) so that the implication that there is a king of France
falls within the purview of the negation as a matter of its semantics. This is
known as the `presupposition'-cancelling semantics. The preferred under-
[7] It is worth noting that the on-line processing orientation of this approach to pragmatics
makes it open to psycholinguistic experimentation in a way that most of the more logically-
based approaches to pragmatics are not. Sinclair (1995: 527) also makes this point in the
context of a comparison of the performance orientation of relevance theory with other
cognitive approaches which treat pragmatics as a Chomskyan competence system. Dan
Sperber is currently engaged in a programme of experimental testing of relevance-theoretic
predictions (see, for instance, Sperber et al. 1995).
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standing on which the existential implication is preserved (or reinstated) is
arrived at pragmatically.
B. The presuppositional analysis advocated by B-R. On his account, the
preferred presupposition-preserving understanding is a product of the
semantics of these sentences and the non-preferred, marked interpretation of
(1)±(3) is accounted for pragmatically.
On the surface, these two analyses look like mirror-images of each other:
(38) (a) semantically: not [the F is G ]
via pragmatics: [the F is not-G]
(b) semantically: [the F is not-G]
via pragmatics: not [the F is G ]
Using a diﬀerent notational scheme, B-R himself displays them as mirror-
image analyses in his 1991 review of Atlas (1989), but there is a crucial
diﬀerence, which is that the representation given in (38b) as the pragmatically
derived presupposition-cancelling case involves metarepresentation. It is
given more accurately in (39) which is, of course, importantly distinct from
the presupposition-cancelling semantics given in (38a):
(39) not [``the F is G'']
So there are three, rather than two, diﬀerent schematic representations in
play here, and the two approaches do not in fact mirror each other. My claim
is that each of the two approaches captures only a part of the full story of
the processing and interpretation of the relevant examples. Once we have
established an appropriate conception of the role of pragmatics in
interpreting P-denials, it will be clear that all three representations are
necessary for a full account of the understanding of the relevant examples.
B-R makes several criticisms of the anti-presuppositionalist (Gricean)
pragmatic approach, given in (38a). First, he points out its failure to account
for the marked, non-preferred status of the `presupposition'-cancelling
interpretation. This is a valid criticism of the externalists, but there is a simple
solution to it, which I shall come to very soon. B-R continues his critique in
the following vein: `What, on a non-presuppositionalist semantics, would
trigger, and provide the rationale for, a pragmatic reanalysis of the negation
as metalinguistic? Nothing whatsoever. The pragmatic reanalysis arises from
the need to resolve a problem. On a non-presuppositional semantics, there is
no problem¼; the negation is semantically analysed as an ordinary,
straightforward, truth-functional denial¼Such non-presuppositional
theories thereby entirely fail to predict that, let alone explain why, the
examples in [(1)±(3)] do, as a matter of empirical fact, fall together with [the
examples in (4)], evincing all the special features characteristic of meta-
linguistic uses of negation.' (B-R 1989a: 120).
Quite generally, the `rationale for a pragmatic reanalysis' is provided by
the failure of an analysis to meet a pragmatic criterion. Within relevance
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theory this means a failure to deliver a satisfactory range of cognitive eﬀects.
Deriving a contradiction, which gives rise to no cognitive eﬀects and so
cannot be established as relevant, is just one clear way in which such a failure
may arise. This may in fact be what goes on in the case of (1)±(3), at least in
those instances which do involve reanalysis. There is nothing, as far as I can
see, to rule out an explanation along these lines despite assuming the wide-
scope, `presupposition'-cancelling, semantics of negation. It will simply
involve adding a further step of pragmatic processing to the position given
in (38a). Schematically, the picture I propose of the interpretation of the
negative sentences in the P-denials, is as follows:
(40) semantically: not [The F is G]
via pragmatic processing (a): [The F is not-G]
via pragmatic processing (b): not [``The F is G'']
Let's take example (1) again, thinking of it now in communicative rather
than semantic terms, as an utterance produced and processed over time. As
emphasised in the previous subsection, you don't get a pass through the
utterance without pragmatic processing. (To try to conceive of this as
possible one would have to imagine cutting the language module free from
its place within the overall interacting mental system and collecting up its
deliverances as they dropped out.) The semantics is the wide-scope negation
which has no entailments, (that is, it cancels so-called presuppositions). Since
this is too weak}uninformative, in most contexts, to meet the criterion of
optimal relevance, the scope of the negation is narrowed so as to achieve
suﬃcient cognitive eﬀects. The negation could, in principle, be taken to target
the existential entailment, but processing eﬀort considerations mediate
strongly against this, since it would leave the predicate `is bald' no role to
play in the interpretation; the concept will have been activated pointlessly,
since it will not enter into the derivation of eﬀects. So the preferred
interpretation, preferred because of its relevance-potential, is the narrow
scope, `presupposition'-preserving, interpretation. This is just one of many
instances of the process of pragmatic strengthening at the level of the
proposition expressed. We would be bound to leave it at that, were it not that
some milliseconds later, when we have processed the next (juxtaposed)
utterance, we ®nd ourselves with a contradiction: there is a king of France
and there isn't a king of France. The overall interpretation of the two clauses
is not consistent with the expectation of optimal relevance and a reanalysis
is sought. This may be a move to an echoic (metalinguistic) analysis, as in B-
R's account, though, as shown in (40), on this account it would be at a second
level of pragmatic processing. But the reanalysis need not, in principle,
involve metarepresentation; it might be a `return', as it were, to the
descriptive wide-scope, `presupposition'-cancelling interpretation. Which of
the two possibilities is the case in any particular instance will depend on the
particularities of contexts.
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I do not want to give the impression that these three levels are always
inevitably involved or that they are of equal status. The semantic level diﬀers
from the two pragmatic levels in that no ®nal interpretation will ever involve
it alone. It is the input to the pragmatic inferential processes, an input which
comes from the linguistic system not as a whole logical form but bit by bit
(perhaps word by word). There are only two levels of actual interpretation
and they are identical with B-R's levels, but, and this is the crucial point,
these are both levels which are the outcome of pragmatic processes.
In fact, the picture given in (40) is not the only one possible for these
utterances. I think there are four possible processing routes for P-denials, for
all of which the input is the same semantically uncommitted negation:
1. ®rst pass: pragmatic narrowing (P-preserving)
second pass: metalinguistic reanalysis (P-cancelling)
This is the processing track just discussed and it is the most likely for the
three examples under discussion; it captures exactly the same intuitions as B-
R's analysis, including the intuition of P-preservation under negation, but
without assuming a presuppositional semantics.
2. ®rst and only pass: metalinguistic interpretation recognised straight
oﬀ (P-cancelling)
This is the case of a context in which the metalinguistic interpretation is the
most accessible one to the hearer (the least eﬀort-requiring). The reversed
metalinguistic cases in (5) and (6) exemplify this, and so do the reversed P-
denials, to be discussed shortly. There are, no doubt, other sorts of contexts
too where this occurs, contexts where it is just obvious that the speaker is in
the business of echoing someone else's particular utterance or someone's
habitual way of expressing himself.
The other two possibilities are less likely, but possible in principle:
3. ®rst pass: pragmatic narrowing (P-preserving)
second pass: pragmatic widening (P-cancelling)
What this amounts to is undoing or repairing a pragmatic strengthening or
enrichment. The following seem to be cases where this goes on:
(41) (a) I have had breakfast. I had it once as a boy many years ago when
I had worked all night and was especially hungry.
(b) Edina: Have you eaten?
Patsy: No ± not since 1973.
(from `Absolutely Fabulous' BBC2, 9}2}94)
The on-line temporal enrichment of the ®rst sentence in (a) and of the
proposition apparently expressed by Patsy's `no' in (b) is a narrowing, from
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the semantically encoded temporal span extending back unboundedly from
the time of utterance, to a much shorter span contained within the day of
utterance. A pragmatic reanalysis takes place as a result of the second clause
in each case which is at odds with that temporal enrichment; the original
pragmatic narrowing is subsequently pragmatically broadened. Here is a P-
denial case where this seems a likely sequence of pragmatic processes:
(42) A: You always hedge everything. Isn't there anything you feel
straightforward simple certainty about?
B: Well, yes, there are a few things I feel sure about. For instance, the
king of France isn't bald and he isn't hairy and he isn't tall and he
isn't short; there isn't any king of France.
Finally, the least likely option:
4. ®rst and only pass: descriptive interpretation (P-cancelling)
This shouldn't be seen as purely the output of semantics, though it is identical
to it; pragmatic inference is involved in deciding that it is the intended
interpretation. Here's an example where this seems a likely interpretive path:
say we are wig-makers to royalty, well aware of which European countries
have monarchs and which don't, and we are making a list of the hirsute
monarchs and the bald monarchs, and one of us remarks: `well, the king of
France is neither bald nor hairy'. No doubt, further playing about with
examples is needed to establish these last two options as real possibilities.
Let us return now, though, to the ®rst scenario, which is the most likely
interpretation and the one which is the direct rival to B-R's account of P-
denials. I think my picture of how this comes about, given in (40), has quite
a lot going for it:
(A) It captures the marked feel that most people comment on for the
`presupposition'-cancelling use; this markedness (the extra eﬀects) arises
from a pragmatic reanalysis here just as it did on B-R's approach.
(B) It is consistent with the examples in (1)±(3) not being intrinsically (that
is, semantically) contradictory, which the evidence in (18), (19) and (21)
strongly indicates is the case. In this respect, the analysis has a de®nite edge
on B-R's account which requires, against the facts, that they are semantically
contradictory.
(C) The widespread intuition that there is something contradictory here is
accounted for by the standard non-presuppositionalist account of the
preferred `presupposition'-preserving understanding. The beauty of this is
that it is a pragmatic account, so it is consistent with the non-contradictory
semantics of the two clauses while meeting B-R's demand for a `rationale for
the pragmatic reanalysis'.
There is a ®nal clear piece of evidence which makes starkly apparent how
very much more satisfactory the two-level pragmatic approach is than the
semantic presuppositional account. Recall the cases in section 3.2 in which
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we reversed the negative sentence and the correction clause of metalinguistic
negations. This made no diﬀerence to the metalinguistic nature of the
utterance nor to its status as a semantic contradiction; what it did do was
make an important diﬀerence to the interpretive process and so to whether
or not a hearer was likely to be garden-pathed. A theory of any depth makes
predictions about relevant data beyond the limited set it addressed at the
outset, so let's see how the two accounts (B-R's and my augmented `Gricean'
account) handle a clause reversal of the P-denial cases:
(43) (a) There is no king of France: so, the king of France is not bald.
(b) The king of France is not bald: there is no king of France.
(44) When did you give up smoking?
(a) I've never smoked in my life (so) I haven't given up smoking.
(b) I haven't given up smoking; I've never smoked in my life.
B-R's account seems to predict that the (a) cases are understood in the same
way as the (b) cases, that is, as `metalinguistic', and that the interpretive
stages involved in arriving at that understanding are the same: on a ®rst pass,
the negative clauses are taken to be presupposition-preserving, then,
understood in conjunction with the other clause a contradiction is reached
and, ®nally, the negative clauses are reanalysed as involving echoic use.
Spelling out the interpretive levels for (44a) looks something like this:
(45) I've never smoked in my life. I haven't given up smoking.
level : (semantics plus bivalence)
Not-P. P and not-Q
(where P¯I have smoked in my life, and Q¯I am a non-smoker now)
Result: logical contradiction `Not-P. P'
level : pragmatic reanalysis (giving metalinguistic P-cancelling negation)
not [``I have given up smoking'']
not [``P and Q'']
But this cannot be right. Placing the `correction'}explanation clause ®rst
eﬀectively prepares the way for the wide-scope (or, perhaps, the echoic)
interpretation of the negative presuppositional sentence. The point is
essentially the same as that argued above for the examples in (5) and (6) (e.g.
`Maggieispatrioticandquixotic;sheisn'tpatrioticorquixotic'):intuitively,
there is no garden-pathing here, no on-line contradiction and so no
pragmatic reanalysis. The (a) versions of (43) and (44) do not have the
marked feel that is typical of the (b) versions, in which the `correction' or
explanation clause follows the negated clause.
The alternative account, on which an all-inclusive semantics for negation
is coupled with a psychologically realistic on-line processing view of
pragmatics, can capture the intuitive interpretive diﬀerences between the (a)
and (b) examples, as it is sensitive to the ordering of the clauses. Given the
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context created by the ®rst explanatory clause in each of (43a) and (44a), the
subsequent negative utterance may well achieve relevance on its semantically
given P-cancelling (non-echoic) understanding and will not need to be
narrowed to exclude the `presupposition' from its scope. Or if, as is quite
likely, these are intended as echoic of a previous utterance (say, the question
in (44)) and this interpretation is suﬃciently accessible to the hearer, they will
be so interpreted on a first pass, with no initial trying out of a descriptive
interpretation and subsequent rejection of it.
The account sketched in (40) involves a small addition to the standard
wide-scope `Gricean' account, a small addition which incorporates what is
right about B-R's account, that is, what captures the markedness intuition,
without making the various false predictions that drastically undermine his
account. It should be clear that Horn's (alleged) dilemma has dissolved, that
an account of P-denials which takes negation to be semantically P-cancelling
(Horn's predicate denial, for instance), but which recognises that in
communicative use these are most often metalinguistic, is neither incoherent
nor redundant.
However, the new improved analysis might be viewed by some with
Occamite suspicion, since it involves three interpretive tiers, the semantic and
the two pragmatically arrived at understandings, whereas both of the
original competitors had only two. There are two points to make in response
to any such worry: ®rst, my claim is that it takes three levels to do justice to
the interpretive facts; economy principles can be brought into play only
when the analyses being assessed all cover the same set of data, which, as I've
shown, is not the case here. This counting of levels should really be dropped
and replaced by counting interpretations, in which case there are two here as
in both the previous accounts; it's just that neither of them coincides with
what is semantically encoded. Second, the richer account I'm proposing, in
fact, calls for no increase in semantic apparatus (in this regard it comes
cheaper than B-R's presuppositional semantics) or in pragmatic principles.
What it does postulate is more interpretive work being done with those
pragmatic principles than either of the original accounts allowed for. In the
last section I would like brie¯y to address this matter, but in a wider context
in which the assumptions underlying B-R's talk of the `appeal' or `resort' to
pragmatics can be compared with the relevance-theoretic view given in
section 6.1.
7.T he semantics}pragmatics distinction
What lies behind B-R's work is a conception of pragmatics as a fairly thin
icing on a substantial semantic cake. Recall his assertion, mentioned in the
previous section, that the wide-scope `presupposition'-cancelling
negationists do not have the means to explain what triggers the pragmatic
reanalysis in cases where this takes place. This in fact depends on a more
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basic assumption expounded elsewhere in his book: `¼if we wish to claim
that the understanding evidenced in [(1)±(3)] is a matter for pragmatics, then
it is not an understanding of negation characterised directly by the
semantics. We are thereby committed to deriving this understanding of
negation [the metalinguistic] from another understanding, where this other
understanding IS directly characterised by the semantics, indeed is
the semantic reading itself.' (B-R 1989b: 228, my emphasis).
He takes this to be an argument which supports his contention that natural
language negation is semantically presupposition-preserving (or at least not
presupposition-cancelling). It can only have this force if the claim is that the
metalinguistic understanding, which is patently pragmatic, is derived
directly from the understanding which is provided by the semantics (or by
semantics plus the bivalence requirement on his 1993 account). The quoted
passage does not say this explicitly, but it appears to be what is meant, since
it would otherwise not support any of the semantic accounts he was assessing
there, whether P-preserving or P-cancelling. Since the understanding that the
metalinguistic analysis is derived from is the one which involves non-
baldness being predicated of an existing king of France it must be that that
is given by the semantics (plus, again, the default application of bivalence).
If the stipulation given in this quotation were correct quite generally, it
would immediately rule out my analysis in (40). But is there any reason to
think that every case of a pragmatically arrived at understanding must be
directly derivable from an understanding given by the semantics? In
particular, why should we believe this of a case which is agreed to involve
deliberate garden-pathing and reanalysis? Consider mildly jokey christmas
cracker type examples such as that in (46). Like the examples B-R is
interested in, its eﬀect depends on hearers being garden-pathed, realising this
and reanalysing:
(46) Q: Why do birds ¯y south in winter?
R: Because it's too far to walk.
The reader}hearer of the interrogative initially takes the `why' to concern the
`southward' direction of the birds' movement. The second utterance does
not, however, provide an answer to that question, but to another question
which involves a diﬀerent understanding of the ®rst utterance, an
understanding on which the `why' concerns the birds' mode of travel. Would
we want to say that the initial, rejected understanding is semantically
encoded, that is, that the `why' is tied to `south' as a matter of the semantics
of the sentence? Surely not, but this is what B-R's stipulation commits him
to: the second (`correct') understanding, which is undoubtedly arrived at
pragmatically, must be derivedfrom an understanding `directly characterised
by the semantics'. The initial interpretation here is patently not a matter of
semantics alone but the outcome of pragmatic processing involving
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stereotypical knowledge about birds, knowledge which makes their ¯ying an
unlikely focus of the `why' question. This strikes me as entirely analogous to
the `presuppositional' negation cases: semantically, both the negation
operator and the `why'}`because' clause are unspeci®ed as to the constituent
they may focus on, so on any interpretation the choice of focus is a matter
for pragmatic inference.
There is a more general point to be made here regarding cases where a
speaker deliberately garden-paths a hearer for eﬀect. On the relevance-
theoretic view, pragmatic inferencing starts as soon as a hearer recognises a
stimulus as ostensive (that is, as communicatively intended); it would be
quite remarkable, then, in cases of garden-paths which involve revision of an
entire initial interpretation, if that ®rst interpretation were wholly a matter
of semantics.
We do not have to look at `clever' cases, where the speaker is deliberately
manipulating addressees' assessments of relevance, to see that B-R's
constraint on the role of pragmatics in utterance interpretation is far too
tight. Consider simple mistakes on the part of hearers in performing the
pragmatic processes of reference assignment and disambiguation. A revision
of one of these processes will, obviously, take place as a result of the ®rst,
pragmatically arrived at, hypothesis not meeting one's pragmatic criterion.
It is quite generally the case, then, that when a pragmatic reanalysis is
undertaken, it is on the basis of a prior pragmatically derived understanding.
Of course, ultimately, back at the beginning as it were, there is a semantic
decoding that kicks the inferencing mechanism into action, but the point I
am trying to make here is that there may be several layers of pragmatic
processing, and that the ®nal understanding may have been derived from a
previous pragmatically derived understanding. B-R cannot ®nd support for
his `presupposition'-preserving semantics for negation simply by observing
that the metalinguistic understanding is pragmatically derived; nothing
follows from this about the semantic or pragmatic nature of the
understanding it is derived from.
A closely related but distinct assumption is what I have called, in section
4.2, B-R's semantic±pragmatic disjunction thesis: that the result of a
pragmatic reanalysis cannot account for a property of the interpretation that
the semantic analysis of the sentence}utterance could account for. This
underlay his view of Horn as caught in a double bind, by virtue of advocating
a semantically P-cancelling negation and a pragmatically arrived at
metalinguistic negation interpretation of the P-denials. The essence of the
supposed problem is that both are P-cancelling. Indeed they are, but this is
not a problem; in fact, both are necessary in order to account fully for the
interpretation of the P-denials, as I believe I have shown in the previous
section.
Here is another stipulation from B-R: `An operator whose understanding
is speci®cally provided for by the semantics of the language should not result
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in any feeling of markedness or specialness when actually applied.' (B-R
1989b: 40) He is, of course, adverting here to the markedness of the wide-
scope, P-cancelling, semantics for negation favoured by Horn, Wilson,
Kempson, etc, and ®nding favour for a semantics for negation which induces
a default P-preservation, since this is the unmarked understanding. I have
shown in (40) how the markedness intuition is comfortably accommodated
within the anti-presuppositionalist approach; in general, it is not the wide
scope descriptive understanding that is in operation on the marked
interpretation, so that the quoted precept does not apply to this account.
However,it'sworthconsideringasageneral pointofprinciple,independently
of the issues around negation, since it is indicative of B-R's view of semantics
and pragmatics.
When we look at the interpretation of utterances in the broader context of
human interpretive activity in general, it is far from obvious that what is
`speci®cally provided for by the semantics of the language should not result
in any feeling of markedness', that it should feel natural, should be the
preferred understanding, while marked or unusual interpretations should be
the result of pragmatic processes. I doubt that there are any absolute
statements to be made regarding the correlation of naturalness or
unnaturalness of interpretations with bare semantics, semantics plus
cognitive bivalence requirements, or pragmatics. However, viewing linguistic
decoding as, on the whole, providing mere propositional schemas, which
function as clues and directives to the interpretive process, rather than fully
¯edged articulations of thoughts and assumptions, does quite forcefully
undermine the view that the deliverances of semantics should be more
natural, or less marked, than the thought-shaped representations that are
rapidly, and virtually automatically, inferred by the relevance-driven
cognitive system. While the sort of markedness that cases of garden-pathing
and reanalysis give rise to must be accounted for pragmatically, there is no
reason at all to assume that the natural but `wrong' interpretation, the
garden-path, is either the product of linguistic semantics alone, or is
particularly closely tied to it.
By way of illustration, let's take what has now become the classic case of
pragmatic enrichment (from Sperber & Wilson 1986: 189):
(47) (a) I have had breakfast.
(b) I have been to Tibet.
Although both examples employ the same linguistic construction for the
expression of tense, these two utterances would usually be understood as
communicating rather diﬀerent temporal spans: while (47b) might reason-
ably be taken to refer to the speaker's lifetime up to the time of utterance,
(47a) is most likely to be taken to refer to a much shorter interval, involving
just the day of utterance up to the point of utterance. As far as I am aware,
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no-one wants to posit a semantic ambiguity in the past perfect, such that each
of its (in®nite) senses covers a diﬀerent time-span. There may be diﬀerences
of opinion as regards where the pragmatically derived meaning surfaces ±
whether as an implicature or as a pragmatic enrichment of the proposition
expressed ± but that issue need not be settled here. The point is that these
`natural' understandings are indisputably pragmatic and the linguistically
given semantics of the tense operator would indeed be felt to be special or
marked if it were not pragmatically narrowed.
This point can be further pushed by consideration of just about any of the
cases of what Griceans call `generalised' conversational implicature. These
involve a pragmatic process which takes place quite generally across
contexts, unless it is speci®cally blocked by particular contextual factors; it
is often referred to as a default inference. So, to take just a couple of
examples:
(48) (a) You can have a cake or a biscuit.
(b) Billy ate some of the cakes.
The neo-Gricean semantics for `or', with which I believe B-R is in
agreement, is the inclusive understanding, and for `some' it is the lower-
bounded `at least' understanding. However, most linguistically untutored,
native speakers take `or' to be exclusive; this is the natural, preferred
interpretation, while the inclusive understanding which is `speci®cally
provided for by the semantics of the language' is the more marked
understanding. On a neo-Gricean account, the `natural' understandings of
(48a) and (48b) are pragmatically derived; in each case, there is a
conversational implicature which, taken together with the proposition
expressed, gives the preferred understanding: the exclusive (`either but not
both') understanding of `or' and the `some but not all' understanding of
`some'. The cautious conclusion, then, is that there is no reason to suppose
that the meanings provided by the semantics of the language should surface,
untouched by pragmatic inference, as the constituents of the preferred
interpretation. We might well want to go further and say that, given the
underdeterminacy thesis and the immediate and proli®c nature of pragmatic
inferencing, natural interpretations are bound to carry a pragmatic
contribution. Nothing follows, yet again, as regards whether natural
language negation should be regarded as P-cancelling (marked) or P-
preserving (unmarked) or neither P-cancelling nor P-preserving. That must
be established on other grounds, as, I believe it has been, in this paper and
elsewhere.
I have given this brief survey of some of the assumptions B-R makes about
the nature of semantics and of pragmatics, and about the relation between
them, in order to show some of the underpinnings of his arguments against
a `presupposition'-cancelling semantics of negation. Both his view that a
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pragmatic reanalysis must be derived directly from a semantically given
understanding and his view that unmarked, or natural, interpretations
should be direct re¯ections of the semantics of operators (albeit completed to
meet bivalency) appear to be false. Both issue from considerable under-
estimation of the role of pragmatic inference in the understanding of
utterances.
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